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Abstract 
This study examines whether Indonesian national health insurance system promotes health equity in 
favour of informal economy workers. It first lays out the theoretical justification on the need of social 
protection, particularly health protection for informal workers. The paper argues that the absence of 
health protection for vulnerable informal workers in Indonesia has reinforced health inequity between 
formal and informal workers, thus provides a justification on extending health protection to this segment. 
It then boils down its analysis on existing BPJS Health scheme, a government-run national health 
insurance, and to what extent this scheme serves the needs of informal workers in Indonesia. The finding 
suggests that several factors (contributory premium, access to healthcare services and politicisation of 
national healthcare) are responsible for adversely incorporating informal workers; hence fail to promote 
health equity in favour of vulnerable workers in informal economy. 
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1. Introduction 
Margaret Chan, WHO Director-General, once stated “no one in need of healthcare, whether curative or 
preventive, should risk financial ruin as a result”. This statement represents what WHO defines as 
universal health coverage (UHC). It is agreed that UHC is one of the ingredients for sustainable 
development; it is not only as development goal in itself –nobody wants to be sick –but also as a promoter 
to achieve other development goal, such as poverty eradication. Evans, et al. (2012) postulated that lack 
of access to healthcare reduces people’s ability to work, thus diminishes their productivity and income. 
Similarly, paying expensive medical bills through sale of individuals’ assets or taking excessive debt leads 
to impoverishment. 
Recognising the importance of UHC, countries have put a great emphasis on reforming their healthcare 
system. In many developing countries, it is common that major challenge of sustaining healthcare system 
is ensuring its efficient and effective health financing strategy. If health is viewed as a right of individuals, 
health financing should ultimately come from government revenues, which in large is general taxation. 
Nonetheless, while this system might be viable in rich nations such as the U.K., this might not hold true in 
many developing countries, whereby informal economy makes up a large percentage of total 
employment. If informal economy is defined as economy operating outside formal regulation (including 
taxation), clearly, large informal sector would mean a missing source of financing for national healthcare. 
At a broader level, health is often referred as one of most important form of social security. ILO defined 
social security as “protection that a society provides to individuals and households to ensure access to 
healthcare and to guarantee income security…” (ILO 2001). Furthermore, ILO’s Declaration of Philadelphia 
in 1944 has stipulated social protection as a basic human right, in which ironically, half of the world’s 
population (mostly the poor and informal workers) does not actually possess. 
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To ensure right of their citizens for social protection, health in particular, developing countries have come 
up with various strategies to expand their health coverage for the poor and informal workers with various 
initiatives, ranging from universal to targeting schemes. In many developing countries, social security 
system is heavily fragmented; consisting of different schemes for different classes of citizens i.e. formal 
vs. informal workers and the rich vs. the poor. Results have generally varied; from a rather ‘successful’ 
universal system such as Thailand which relied on general taxation to a problematic targeting scheme like 
India’s Rashtriya Swasthya Bima Yojna (RSBY; a free care for population below poverty line). 
Unanimous global agreement to put forward UHC has incentivised the author to analyse the issues facing 
healthcare system at narrower lens into national level, with a particular attention on workers in informal 
economy. Indonesian newly introduced national health insurance (NHI) system in early 2014 called 
Jaminan Kesehatan Nasional (JKN) managed by a Healthcare and Social Security Agency called Badan 
Penyelenggara Jaminan Sosial (BPJS) Kesehatan has been picked as a case study for this paper.  
Indonesian case is particularly interesting as Indonesia has recently launched a single ambitious reform in 
the realm of NHI to explicitly include informal workers. Previous healthcare system had been heavily 
fragmented with the majority of workers enrolled were formal workers. Thus, the new system is believed 
to reduce health inequity among classes of citizens including formal vs. informal workers. On the other 
hand, Indonesian informal economy landscape is still characterised with high vulnerability in terms of the 
absence of social protection of any kind, including health (ILO 2009). Hence, following the global attention 
toward UHC, Indonesian government has passed two key laws (1) Law on the National Social Security 
System No. 40/2004 in 2004 and (2) Law to establish the Social Security Agency (BPJS) in October 2011, 
Law 24/2011. With Law 24/2011, the government has developed the Road Map toward National Health 
Insurance—Universal Coverage 2012-2019. 
1.1. Research question 
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With informal economy landscape in mind, this paper will attempt to answer one main question which 
will be divided into two sub-questions as follow: 
Does Indonesian national health insurance serve a potential for improving health equity in favour of 
workers in informal economy? 
a) Why is health protection needed for informal economy workers? 
b) Does the current system have a potential to serve the needs of informal workers when measured 
in terms of 
i. Contributory premium 
ii. Access to information and health services 
iii. Health politics 
1.2. Significance of the study 
This study is important for several reasons. First, it identifies some trends in developing countries’ 
adoption of UHC and how do they conform to a theory that health is a right of individuals. Second, the 
study fills the gap of literatures by approaching health equity from an alternative perspective of informal 
workers. Moreover, its originality comes from the fact that there has been very few academic research 
on Indonesian newly adopted health insurance with special attention to informal workers. Therefore, it 
hopes to provide inclusive portfolio of existing literatures. Third, it is expected that the study can add to 
broader implications in identifying factors that may contribute to health equity and/or reinforce health 
inequity in the adoption of UHC for other developing countries. 
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1.3. Research method and outline 
This study is a qualitative research which may include some quantitative statistics to justify the arguments. 
It utilises existing academic and fieldwork research to gather the data and support its analysis. It also relies 
heavily on data and paper published by international organisations such as ILO and WHO, as well as 
government official publications. The case study also depends on media publications for some issues 
relating to current implementation of policy on Indonesian NHI. 
The major limitation of this study is in particular related to its case study as it is a fairly recent policy thus 
the data obtained might not be fully sufficient to support the argument. Also, there is no single definition 
on what is considered as informal economy thus there will be some inconsistency in its analysis. 
Nonetheless, the paper has attempted to acknowledge these limitations in its analysis to minimise the 
problem of over-generalisation.  
The following sections are structured as follows. The second section provides a theoretical justification on 
the provision of social protection as well as relevant theory of UHC. It also covers global trend on the 
adoption of UHC with some issues facing informal workers. The third section, the case study, provides an 
in-depth perspective on Indonesian health insurance. It initially analyses the evolution of social protection 
in Indonesia with a focus on health insurance system. It then offers hindsight whether the current health 
insurance serves the needs of informal workers with some analysis on different parameters including 
health politics at broader level. The concluding part presents some reflections on NHI and summarised 
main findings based on the research questions as well as recommendations for further research. 
2. Inclusive approach to social protection and health equity 
Drawing from existing literatures (ILO 2001, 2009; WHO 2010, 2013; OXFAM 2013; Asante, et al. 2013), 
this paper attempts to layout the linkages between social protection, UHC and NHI in general. 
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As Figure 1 depicts, the top level of ‘development’ goal lays the fulfilment of human rights; social 
protection is one of basic human rights. As the Universal Declaration of Human Rights 1948 states that 
“everyone, as a member of society, has the right to social security…”1 (Article 22), “and (social security) 
refers specifically to the right to medical care and necessary social services, to security in the event of 
sickness, disability, widowhood, old age and unemployment, and to special care and assistance for 
motherhood and childhood (Article 25). Thus, this statement imply that UHC can be considered as a part 
of social protection; as equally implied in The World Health Assembly resolution 58.33 in 2005 “everyone 
should be able to access health services” (WHO 2010). 
Member states of WHO have been committed to adopt UHC at the national level, which essentially seek 
to reform their healthcare system. This system can be financed either through general taxation or health 
insurance; or a mixture of both (OXFAM 2013). Health insurance can be defined as insurance to cover 
future medical sickness financed by contributory premium paid by the members, their employers or by 
                                                          
1 Social security is often used interchangeably with social protection (ILO 2009) 
Human Rights
Social Protection
Universal Health Coverage
National Healthcare System
Tax-based financing National Health Insurance
Formal Sectors Informal Sectors
Figure 1. The linkages
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the state. Health insurance can take many forms, public, private or community-based; nonetheless, this 
paper will focus on the former which generally defined as social/national health insurance. 
2.1. Why do we need social protection? 
There are two contending perspectives on the needs of social protection and ultimately its provision 
(Meagher 2015a). First, as mentioned previously, is right-based social protection and second is social risk 
management, as proposed by the World Bank. Viewing social protection from risk management 
perspective means that social protection is an investment on human capital (Hiroshi 2008 as cited in ILO 
2010) that is needed to manage risks that may affect workers’ productivity, efficiency and eventually 
economic growth. However, flawed social protection can backfire on economic growth. For instance, in 
Mexico where people in low-productive employment (informal workers) were given more social benefits 
than formal workers, formal workers would be motivated to move to informal sector (Levy 2008).  
Social risk management perspective is often argued for reinforcing neo-liberal agenda in the realm of 
social protection. For instance, its provision needs to rely on the basis of efficiency, which market should 
be the first provider of social protection (e.g. private health insurance). The role of state is to facilitate the 
operation of market mechanisms within the social protection (Ridha 2014). Contrast to this, right-based 
social protection argued that it is ultimately global and national (state) responsibilities for the provision 
of social protection. 
While these perspectives on social protection seem to be contradictory, there has been some 
convergence of ideas on the needs of social protection. From development perspective, social protection 
can be both understood as basic human right and managing risks to achieve other outcomes. Sen (1999) 
sees development as ‘expansion of human freedom’, believes that expansion of human freedom can be 
seen as the primary end (constitutive roles) and the principal means of development (instrumental roles 
of freedom). In light of social protection, it can be seen as the primary end (basic human right) and the 
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principal means for economic growth (e.g. healthy workers are more productive for economy than sick 
ones). 
As for UHC, this paper believes that while UHC strongly sees health as human right, it also seems to 
converge toward looking at financial risks associated with expensive medical bills. A resolution of the 
United Nations General Assembly in 2012 which promotes UHC highlights the importance of UHC as 
‘principal means’ in alleviating poverty and in achieving sustainable development (WHO 2010). 
2.2. Health equity through UHC approach 
Orem and Zikusooka (2010) defined health equity as ‘fairness’ in financial contribution towards healthcare 
and ‘fairness’ in benefiting from its services. Moreover, they stipulated that equitable health financing is 
thus a system that seeks financial contribution according to people’s ability to pay (i.e. the poor pay less 
than the rich), while offering non-discriminatory healthcare according to their needs. 
In promoting UHC and thus health equity for all, WHO (2010 as cited in Acharya, et al. 2012) has laid down 
requirements for successful UHC through NHI scheme. First, its contribution to the risk pool needs to be 
compulsory to prevent adverse selection to the scheme (i.e. rich and healthy will opt out). Second, the 
risk pool has to have large numbers of people to handle large health costs and spread risk sufficiently, as 
pools with a small number cannot spread risk sufficiently and are too small to handle large health costs. 
Third, in the presence of large number of poor, pooled funds needs to be subsidised from state revenue 
(this is often referred as demand-side subsidies2). More importantly, NHI scheme shall eventually reduce 
out-of-pocket payments by the individuals and maximise mandatory pre-payment (OXFAM 2013) to 
enable maximum cross-subsidies between the rich vs. the poor and the healthy vs. the sick. WHO 
stipulated that out-of-pocket payments above 15-20% of total health expenditure can lead to 
impoverishment (Lagomarsino, et al. 2012). 
                                                          
2 Subsidies to support healthcare from healthcare demander/ patients 
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In the realm of health expenditure, attention should be on improving healthcare infrastructure such as 
human resources, medical supplies, distribution of health facilities, and the quality of healthcare 
(Thabrany 2008). This can be partly financed through insurance funds as well as supply-side subsidies3. 
The state also needs to pay attention on health service needs of population and match services to those 
needs as well as creates incentives for the providers to deliver better services and take action against poor 
performance (OXFAM 2013). 
2.3. Informal economy: The concept and focus 
The term ‘informal sector’ was first coined by the ILO to describe “activities of the working poor who were 
working very hard but who were not recognised, recorded, protected or regulated by the public 
authorities” (ILO 1972). In this sense, informal economy was characterised by low-productivity sector and 
seen as residual economy which might diminish as the economy grows. Thus, informal economy was 
considered unfavourable for economic growth and the attention should be focused on formalisation of 
informal sector. Nonetheless, this has not been the case whereby informal economy is growing over the 
past decade, even in some industrialised nations, with much greater complexity (ILO 2002). 
There is no single definition of informal economy. Different organisations and nations often used their 
own definitions; however they shared one important characteristic –operated outside formal regulatory 
framework. Most often, informal economy is also characterised with high level of vulnerabilities which 
lacks of adequate social protection mainly at the bottom end. Thus, ILO attention has been focused on 
‘decent work deficits’ in formal and informal enterprises and workers. Decent work deficits are best 
viewed as  “poor-quality, unproductive and unremunerative jobs that are not recognised or protected by 
law, the absence of rights at work, inadequate social protection, and the lack of representation and voice” 
(ILO 2002). 
                                                          
3 Government directs subsidies into healthcare facilities 
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Ever since, there has been global pushes for research on extending social protection, which mainly exist 
in formal sector, to informal sector by international organisations such as ILO as well as global and national 
NGOs for informal economy (e.g. WIEGO, OXFAM, SEWA).  However, one major challenge in informal 
economy research has been in terms of measuring its reliable statistics due to its paradox of inclusion (i.e. 
recording the unrecorded sector) (Meagher 2015b). Comparability among nations has been a major 
problem in measuring informality which led researchers to construct their own estimates which 
sometimes lead to different conclusions (The World Bank 2013). Nonetheless, ILO and the Delhi Group 
since 2006 have produced manuals on surveys for informal economy which has improved statistical 
comparability among nations significantly (The World Bank 2013). 
WIEGO (n.d.) extends the definition of informal economy through segmenting it into different level. Figure 
1A illustrates the level of informal employment, with the highest level is employer, and while at the lower 
end are mostly low-wage informal workers and unpaid family workers. Other things equal, the level of 
income is parallel to this structure by which those at the bottom end receive the least income as well as 
are exposed to highest level of vulnerability. 
This dissertation mostly directs its focus on health equity for vulnerable informal workers, who are mainly 
at the bottom end. It is because these segments are often excluded in market provision of health 
insurance (i.e. too poor to purchase health insurance). This causes these workers to have high level of 
vulnerability including greater exposure of financial risks in the case of chronic illnesses. Furthermore, in 
the case of wage workers, lack of formal regulation and enforcement of code of conducts might also 
incentivise the employers to exploit the workers by forcing them to work long hours and being paid far 
below minimum wage. This will therefore expose them to a greater risk of being ill. 
If we compare the level of vulnerability faced between formal and informal workers at the similar level of 
income, other things equal, informal workers possess greater vulnerability because of irregularity of 
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income and unstable jobs (Sciortino 2014). Formal workers are protected under labour regulation and 
often covered by social protection, thus even if they are at the low level of income range, they are still 
able to benefit from these regulatory framework. 
2.4. NHI in the presence of substantial informal economy 
In many developing countries, social protection system is heavily fragmented, which means there are 
different social protection schemes for different target groups. Perry, Maloney and Arias (2007) found 
that almost Latin American countries have ‘truncated welfare system’ which means that formal sector 
employees are covered in extensive social protection scheme, including health insurance, whereas 
informal workers often do not have access to such protection or other government benefits. 
To fill this gap for informal sectors, some developing countries such as Rwanda, Ghana and Mali, have 
relied on fragmented and voluntary community-based health insurance schemes (Lagomarsino, et al. 
2012). Unlike compulsory health insurance, these schemes tend to create moral hazard problems; those 
who were at high risks of chronic illnesses tend to enrol themselves while healthy people tend to opt-out 
(Lagomarsino, et al. 2012; Bitran 2014). In Vietnam, moral hazard problem tends to be associated with 
income level. Jowett, Deolalikar and Martinsson (2014) found that insured individuals are more likely to 
use outpatient facilities and public services with an effect that is “particularly strong at lower income 
levels”. This moral hazard, thus, risks that such system would be unsustainable in the long run because 
health expenditure outweighs financing. 
Apart from voluntary insurance, there is a similar pattern of developing countries’ attempts on extending 
social protection, with initial enrolment by formal workers, followed by government-subsidised schemes 
for the poor (Bitran 2014). For example, India introduced RSBY scheme targeted for below the poverty 
line (BPL) families in informal sector (Gothoskar 2014). However, such scheme ran into difficulty in terms 
of identifying who is poor enough to qualify (Lagomarsino, et al. 2012) and it is found that many vulnerable 
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workers (migrants, street-children, deserted women) were excluded from this scheme (Gothoskar 2014). 
Henceforth, fragmented system often creates ‘the missing middle problem’, which refers to segments 
that are just little above the cut-off-point of poverty line (Bitran 2014). 
Following the adoption of UHC, compulsory and single pool NHI looks appealing as it offers potential to 
promote health equity due to its mandatory pre-payment and pooling that can be distributed equitably 
across the population (OXFAM 2013). While this might be viable option in developed countries, the major 
challenge facing many developing countries is to include those working in informal economy. There are 
several reasons why extending health insurance to informal workers tends to be difficult. 
In terms of contributory premium, employers often do not record informal workers, especially casual 
workers. Thus, it is difficult to administer and collecting contributions from these workers. In addition, 
since many informal workers (i.e. mostly seasonal and temporary workers) do not have binding contract, 
they are paid daily or weekly by their employers without fixed amount of income (Thabrany 2008). This 
irregularity has made determination and the collection of contributory premium to be problematic. Some 
countries have avoided this problem by relying on general taxation while some tried to seek fair amount 
of contributory premiums from informal workers. Results have been varied, whereby there is no strong 
evidence that countries with contributory-scheme offer better or worse protection compared to those 
which rely on general taxation (Xu K, et al. 2007 as cited in Tangcharoensathien, et al. 2011). 
While relying on general taxation for public health services often caused informal workers to be ‘free 
riders’ of healthcare system, OXFAM (2013) argued that when health is considered as the right of citizens, 
successful countries, even in the presence of large informal economy, tend to finance their health 
expenditure by tax revenues. Malaysia has achieved universal coverage (i.e. 100% population is covered 
under financial protection scheme) because it relies on general taxation (Tangcharoensathien, et al. 2011). 
Thailand, before the introduction of UHC in 2002, 30% of the total population has no social protection in 
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2001, mostly in the informal sector (Tangcharoensathien, et al. 2011). When the government decided to 
rely on general revenues, there has been vast improvement in terms of health coverage and access to 
services (WHO 2010 as cited in OXFAM 2013). Furthermore, the proportion of poorest families facing 
catastrophic health expenditures went down dramatically from 4% in 2000 to 0.9% in 2006 (WHO 2010 as 
cited in OXFAM 2013). 
Those in favour of general taxation system argued that contributory scheme for informal workers tend to 
be inefficient because costs of administering and collecting contributions will be much higher than 
collected contributions. In Ghana, premium paid by the informal sector is only below 5% of financing cost 
of NHI scheme (OXFAM 2013; NHI Authority 2010 as cited in Lagomarsino, et al. 2012). Also, there was a 
tendency of distrust with the scheme among informal workers which makes enrolment rates to be low 
especially among the poor population (Criel, et al. 2014). 
South Korea, in contrast, offers a success story of contributory-based NHI scheme for those working in 
informal economy. NHI scheme of South Korea has improved health equity in favour of informal workers, 
particularly for self-employed population. This mainly has to do with more equitable contribution system. 
Jeong (2010) postulated that the success are due to three reasons, first, contribution rates from informal 
workers were set at affordable level; second, there were supports from national treasury and third, 
sustained economic growth has increased the capacity of nation to finance the system. 
In terms of access of information and health services, national health insurance might actually reinforce 
health inequity between formal and informal workers. Alfers (2013) study on Ghana NHI scheme found 
that richer society can pay others to do the work for them than poorer ones. Also, NHI registration tends 
to be easier at wealthier district than poorer ones. On one hand, time wasted by informal workers to 
register and access the scheme caused them to be less productive at work thus fails to provide economic 
empowerment. On the other hand, formal workers, even at lower socio-economic status, may well have 
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been able to take a day’s paid leave to do his or her NHIS registration. Single-pool NHI scheme also fails 
to address the problem of social exclusion which may affect informal workers’ access to healthcare 
services. Social exclusion in the provision of healthcare may be due to discriminatory practices of medical 
professionals within the context of poor accessibility and quality of services (Criel, et al. 2014). Thus, while 
high enrolment rates of informal workers into NHI may indicate a success story, it does not explain the 
delivery of healthcare toward informal workers. 
Health protection is undeniably important for every citizen, including informal workers. While offering 
single health package for all citizens can improve health equity, this might not be the best option in 
developing countries in the presence of lack of financial contributions and low government revenue.  Thus, 
it is important to pay attention to priority needs of informal workers in order to avoid unsustainable health 
system. Informal economy is highly diverse in terms of sectors and levels, thus there exist different 
priorities among these workers. These priorities depend on, (1) demographic characteristics (women, 
children, men and old age); (2) Degree of hazards in different activities (e.g.: garbage collectors); (3) 
Locations (home-based, on the streets, in small allocated places); (4) Social intercourse (tendency in 
communities and not companies); (5) Capability to contribute a specified premium contributions 
(Suprobo, Tarigan and Weiss 2007; ILO 2009). 
To illustrate, some workers may be in need of health protection than others. In contrast, other workers 
such as those in construction sectors may need occupational health and safety hazard (OSH) more than 
others. Alfers (2009) found that because of ambitious NHI goal, Ghanaian government tend to put more 
attention toward curative care while there has been lack of considerations for work-related injury for 
informal sectors. This paper theorises that lack of government consideration on informal workers’ 
priorities may partly be due to politicisation of healthcare services, as illustrated in the following case 
study. 
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To sum up, while NHI addresses the lack of social protection in informal economy, it may paradoxically 
reinforce or worsen health inequity between formal and informal workers due to reasons mentioned 
above; contributory premium problem, access to information and services, as well as different priority 
and needs of workers in informal economy. 
3. Health equity and NHI scheme: Indonesian case study 
The following section tries to understand the dynamics of social protection, particularly health protection 
for informal workers in Indonesia. It first lays out current health statistics, followed by the evolution of 
social protection and informal economy. Lastly, it analyses current Indonesian NHI scheme with special 
focus of workers in informal sector. 
3.1. Snapshot of Indonesian health system 
Indonesia, located in South-East Asia region, in 2013 is considered as low-middle income country 
according to the World Bank classification. WHO (2015) has laid out the statistics of Indonesian current 
health situation. In terms of life expectancy at birth of 71 years of age, it performs above the World Bank 
income region average (66). In 2012, cardiovascular and diabetes constituted as highest burden of disease 
(measured by healthy-life years lost due to the disease). Tobacco use is regarded as the highest adult 
health-risks factor, especially among men. About 67% of men in Indonesia are smoking, which translates 
into 34% of world’s men smokers. 
According to WHO (n.d.), Indonesian health equity based on economic status, when measured in terms 
of reproductive, maternal, new-born and child health intervention (RMNCH), has improved over the past 
decade. However, 2012 data showed that while 80.4% population is covered by RMNCH, there is still a 
considerable gap between the poorest quintile (68.9%) and the richest quintile (85.5%). Furthermore, 
health inequity is significant in the case of child mortality rates, 21.8 vs. 69.7 deaths per 1000 births for 
richest and poorest quintiles respectively. 
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Figure 2A by the WHO laid out the current health financing system quite clear. In terms of health 
expenditure, share of government spending allocated to health  is 7% which only accounts for 1% of GDP 
in 2013. Regionally and globally, its position is at the lowest-end of expenditure as a share of GDP, thus 
indicating that health system is still under-funded. While the government only contributed to 39% of 
country’s health spending, out-of-pocket expenditure by the household is nearly half (46%) of total 
country’s spending. This figure is alarmingly high considering WHO criteria of 20% out-of-pocket payments 
as a share of total health spending may lead to impoverishment (Lagomarsino, et al. 2012). 
3.2. The evolution of social protection in Indonesia 
The legislation of social protection in Indonesia was underlined in The 1945 Constitution of the Republic 
of Indonesia. Article 28H (3) stipulates that “every citizen has the right to social security and underlines 
the role of the state in providing universal social security coverage” and article 34 (2) states that the “state 
shall develop a system of social security for all people and shall empower the inadequate and 
underprivileged in society in accordance with human dignity” (ILO 2009).  Thus, this legislation seems to 
fit into right-based perspective of social protection whereby it is the ultimate responsibility of the state to 
provide social security for its citizens, including informal workers. 
In terms of national health insurance scheme, the government first introduced compulsory health 
insurance for civil servants in 1968, followed by a system for private sector workers in 1977 (ILO 2009). In 
1992, the State Corporation PT Jamsostek (Social Security for Workers) was established as a body to 
manage social insurance for formal workers which include health, pensions, death and OSH benefits (ILO 
2009). One important features of Jamsostek programme is that private firms were granted an option to 
provide their own insurance or medical protection for their workers, which subsequently reduce the 
enrolment rates; only 10% of formal sector workers and dependent enrolled (JLN n.d.), thus minimise 
potential of cross-subsidisation of the scheme. 
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Following 1998-99 financial crisis, the government has undergone extensive reform including 
decentralisation reform and granted most authorities, including healthcare services to subnational and 
regional authorities—except fiscal, national security, foreign policy, and religious affairs (Thabrany 2008). 
One major concern is that, any national health reform would be complicated by this decentralisation due 
to intricate and fragmented set of financing flows (JLN n.d.) that might reinforce unequitable health 
distributions among districts and regions (Thabrany 2008). For instance, poor districts would have 
insufficient funding for healthcare thus would focus on fee-for-service health delivery (e.g. privatising 
public hospitals) whereas rich districts might initiate free healthcare for the citizens. 
While regional autonomy in healthcare still exists to date, following UHC commitment, the government 
passed the SJSN Act No.40 of 2004 on national social security system which basically re-instated 
government commitment to provide universal coverage in the realm of social protection. Following this 
decree, in the same year, the government developed a fully subsidised social security targeted for the 
poorest section of society (around 40 millions), called Askeskin (Sparrow, Suryahadi and Widyanti 2013; 
JLN n.d.). The scheme then was extended to covers the near poor (76.4 millions) in 2008 and was renamed 
as Jamkesmas (JLN n.d.; Bitran 2014). 
Despite a substantial increase in coverage, Mukti (2013 as cited in Bitran 2014) stipulated that only 58% 
of Indonesians were covered under fragmented health insurance schemes (see table 1). Thus in 2011, the 
government passed another law in October 2011, Law 24/2011 to establish the Social Security Agency 
(BPJS). In terms of national healthcare system, this law called for an integration of the multiple insurance 
schemes into one single-pool scheme called JKN 4  (Jaminan Kesehatan Nasional/ National Health 
Insurance) managed by BPJS Health organisation, creating largest single-pool system in the world (Bitran 
2014). 
                                                          
4 Sometimes the term ‘BPJS Health’ is used interchangeably with JKN. 
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Under the new NHI scheme which started to operate in early 2014, the government has set an ambitious 
target for 100% enrolment rates of population Indonesia. To date, nearly 150 million people are enrolled 
in the system which accounted for roughly 58% of total population, which interestingly, reflects the same 
percentage under previous fragmented insurance schemes5. Broadly speaking, there are two different 
membership types of BPJS Health based on payments of contributory premiums; (1) the poor (PBI) whose 
contributions are paid fully by the government (2) non-poor (Non-PBI) whose contributions depended on 
the types of employments. Non-PBI members are divided into two, formal and informal workers. While 
formal workers’ contributions are paid by the employers and the employees themselves based on certain 
percentage of their salaries, informal workers’ contributions are set by fixed amount regardless of their 
income levels. However, informal workers have three sets of options of contribution amounts which will 
determine services that they receive (First, second and third class services). Nonetheless, the government 
is committed to abolish class-based healthcare delivery by 2019 (Mukti 2012). By then, BPJS Health will 
also operate double sanctions; for those who have not registered themselves and for late payments of 
those who are registered into the scheme. 
3.3. Informal economy landscape in Indonesia 
There are varieties of definition on what constitute informal economy in Indonesia according to different 
government and non-government institutions (Suprobo, Tarigan and Weiss 2007). However, the paper 
will focus on the definitions of informal economy based on the Central Statistics Body (BPS), as its 
definition is regarded as the most comprehensive one at the national level (Subropo, Tarigan and Weiss 
2007; ILO 2010). BPS adopted the definition from ILO’s 1992 Surveys of Economically Active Population, 
Employment, Unemployment and Underemployment to define informality as  “traditional economic 
activity conducted by low level or unstructured organisations without transaction accounts, in a casual 
                                                          
5 As per July 24, 2015, enrolment rates of JKN are 149,172,165 (BPJS Kesehatan 2014a). Total population estimated 
257,563,815 in 2015 (UN Population 2015). 
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relationship, and based on personal relations rather than contract or formal agreement” (Joedadibrata 
2012). 
Table 2 reflects how BPS determines the level of informality based on employment status and main types 
of jobs. This is indeed an extensive feature of WIEGO’s classification (see figure 1A) which categorises 
informal economy based on types (level) of jobs. Prior to year 2006, BPS only categorised informal sector 
workers as workers ‘outside formal-working relationship’ thus, in the table 2, informal economy referred 
to all employment status except (3) and (4) (Suprobo, Tarigan and Weiss 2007). However, it had masked 
the dynamics of informality that exist; hence, combining these two main features seemed to be more 
reflective of realities (ILO 2010). 
Table 3 shows that the old categorisation of informal sector had overstated the proportion of informal 
economy. However, one main important feature is that, although the size of informal sector had 
fluctuated over a decade, the number was consistently above two-thirds of total employment. The 
implication for social security provision is that, in order to achieve universal coverage, there is indeed a 
considerable justification why focus needs to be directed to informal workers. It is also interesting to note 
that there is more informal jobs in rural than urban areas (47% vs. 18% in 2009). 
In terms of types of jobs, table 4 shows strikingly that informal workers are over-represented in 
agricultural-based activities i.e. over 93%, while it is under-represented professional and administration 
works. In addition, informality has been growing in services and production sector. These trends are worth 
considering in order to understand the actual priority needs of informal workers as well as their ability to 
contribute to NHI. 
3.4. Inequity in health facilities and informal coping mechanisms 
Indonesian healthcare facilities consist of health centres and public and private hospitals. Health centres 
mainly provide primary healthcare normally at sub-district levels and headed by a newly-graduate general 
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practitioner (Thabrany 2008). Before the introduction of UHC, the patients have to pay small amount of 
user service fees, which vary between districts. The significance of health centres is that its close proximity 
to population, thus enabling easy access for healthcare. On the other hand, both public and private 
hospitals generally provide secondary and tertiary health services with different class treatments.  
User fees of health centres and public hospitals are generally heavily subsidised through supply-side 
subsidies (Thabrany 2008) indicating that these subsidies have been regressive since hospitals receive 
larger subsidies than health centres. Unfortunately, the poor refrain from coming to hospitals fearing 
expensive bills which eventually create health inequity among the citizens (Thabrany 2008; Sparrow, 
Suryahadi and Widyanti 2013). Furthermore, doctors in health centres and public hospitals are allowed to 
conduct private practices in the evening and charge single payment for every visit as well as provide some 
medications which are unavailable in health centres or public hospitals. They attracted demand from the 
poor and informal workers to go to these private practices (Thabrany 2008; Suprobo, Weiss and Tarigan 
2007).  
As seen in table 1, roughly 42% of Indonesian population is not covered under fragmented social 
protection, with mostly informal workers (Mukti 2013 as cited in Bitran 2014) relying on their own coping 
strategy in the case of illnesses. There have been different strategies adopted by informal workers which 
generally varied according to their level of income and types of jobs. It is not uncommon that many 
informal workers have negative perception on the effectiveness of health centres, thus they prefer to go 
to private practices. One major reason is because these health centres are severely underfunded due to 
the fact that government subsidies have been mostly directed to public hospitals (Sparrow, Suharyadi and 
Widyanti 2013). Decentralisation reform also worsens this condition because poor districts would 
normally have fewer budgets to subsidise health centres. As a result, patients receive poor services and/or 
pay high user fees. 
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Suprobo, Weiss and Tarigan (2007) conducted various micro case-studies to examine different coping 
strategies of informal workers. First, street traders Karang Ayu market in Semarang would prefer to go to 
practicing doctors for seeking medications due to negative perception of health centres. They also 
generally receive high income thus are able to rely on their income (varied from IDR600,000/month to 
couple of millions) to pay for the doctors (normally IDR25,000/visit). Majority of them are not covered 
under Jamsostek, partly because of age factors (old), the health centres referred by Jamsostek are too far 
from their houses, as well as lack of awareness about the scheme. 
Second, at the other end, sidewalk traders in Klaten receive very small income (gross IDR15,000/day) and 
do not have enough saving for sudden or chronic illnesses. One trader stated that normally he would take 
care of himself if he was sick and if there is an emergency need, he can sell rice from his side job as a 
farmer. This, therefore, indicates high level of vulnerability in the absence of health insurance. 
Third, informal workers also rely on their social capital through their relatives or friends as well as 
associations for large healthcare expenditure. The members of The Process-Farming Group Association-
Group of Women in Jakarta, for instance, when encountered with financial difficulties, will seek helps 
from close friends, relatives or selling off their assets. They also sometimes rely on the pool-money under 
Arisan6 programme in the association. 
From the above passage, it is clear that the absence of health insurance has regressive impacts on workers 
in informal economy, especially poor informal workers as urgent need of health costs will require them 
to sell off their assets. This effect is magnified where the presence of informality has been consistently 
above two-thirds of total employment. This condition therefore supports the need of UHC as proposed 
by WHO –no one should ruin financial risks related to expensive health costs. NHI might be one option, as 
                                                          
6 Arisan is a ‘common activity conducted by Indonesian society in which a group of people gathered to submit 
certain amount of money and one or some of the group member would be randomly picked to get the money’ 
(Suprobo, Tarigan and Weiss 2007). 
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chosen by Indonesian government; however, closer examination is needed to analyse the policy whether 
it might improve or otherwise worsen health equity for informal workers. 
3.5. BPJS Health for informal workers 
Fragmented health protection system has pushed Indonesian government to launch an ambitious single-
pool NHI scheme JKN, commonly referred to as BPJS Health starting from January 2014 with an ambitious 
goal to cover all Indonesian by 2019. BPJS Health is a comprehensive scheme that covers almost all health 
services from primary to tertiary healthcare which include promotive, preventive and curative healthcare 
as well as medications according to individuals’ needs. These services are provided by health centres, 
public hospitals as well as private hospitals that have opted to join the scheme as providers (Razavi 2015). 
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While BPJS Health scheme can be examined through various indicators, this paper, however, only tries to 
highlight several following parameters to analyse whether BPJS Health may improve or worsen health 
equity for informal workers. 
3.5.1. Contributory premium 
In terms of contributory premium to BPJS pool, Non-poor members (Non-PBI) contributions are as follows; 
civil servants and military personnels’ contribution is 5% of their monthly income with 3% paid by the 
government and 2% paid by the employees; state-owned enterprises and private formal workers are 
obligated to pay a premium of 4.5% of their salary, 4% payable by employers and 0.5% payable by 
employees; non-salaried workers, which include informal workers, the self-employed and investors pay 
fixed monthly premiums of between IDR25,500 and IDR59,500 in a tiered system of first, second and third-
class services depend on the amount of contribution paid. For the poor and near poor (PBI), the 
contribution of IDR19,225 is fully funded by the government. 
As discussed in the previous section about UHC requirements that has been proposed by WHO, the 
current BPJS Health is believed to meet some UHC requirements. First, it is compulsory for all Indonesian 
citizens, thus has a potential in preventing adverse selection into the system. The large number of 
enrolment also leads to sufficient risk spreading. However, there is a concern with regard to the fairness 
in terms of government subsidies for the scheme. Mukti (2013 as cited in Bitran 2014) found that there 
are one-third of informal workers currently under PBI scheme. The remaining two-thirds are above cut-
off point and are required to join the scheme under payable fixed-amount premium latest by 2019. The 
current scheme indeed is rather problematic. As mentioned earlier, PBI members received fully subsidised 
services while those with income just slightly above poverty-line would have to pay for their healthcare. 
Indonesia’s poverty dynamics are fluid and there are a large number of the near poor live close to the 
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poverty line; about 40% and 60% of Indonesians live below 1.5 and 2 times of poverty line respectively 
(Sciortino 2014). 
To deliver more equitable system particularly for those fall into near-poor category, the JKN road map has 
stated the possibility of government subsidies for the ‘non-poor’ in the informal sector (Sciortino 2014). 
Unfortunately, there is no clear definition on what constitutes informal workers under SJSN law; informal 
workers are only defined as non-salaried workers, thus exclude those under employers-employees jobs 
(Sibarani 2014). It clearly contrasts the dynamics of informal economy relationships as defined by the BPS 
statistical body (see table 2). As a consequence, this discrepancy in definition will make targeted subsidy 
for non-poor informal workers be more difficult and potentially exclude those in need of subsidies and 
reinforce health inequity among informal workers. 
While the immediate solution would be to cover all informal workers under PBI membership, it might 
increase the prevalence of informality. Levy (2008) study on Mexico found that the dualistic social policy 
in which the government heavily subsidised social security for informal sectors has led formal employers 
and employees to shift to informal economy instead. Greater informality, in this case, would be 
unfavourable as it might lead to unsustainable scheme resulted from reduction of pooled funds. 
Setting fixed contributory premium for informal workers may also reinforce inequity between employers 
and employees working in the informal economy because the employers can easily evade of not 
contributing to their informal workers contribution. Worse still, it may also reinforces gender inequity, 
since men are predominantly at the top end of informal structure, thus employers are much more likely 
to be men (see figure 1A). This informal structure is proven in the case of Indonesia since the average 
women’s income in informal sector is only 75% of that of men in 2008, even when calculated in terms of 
wage per hour, women still earns 20% less than men (see table 5). The good news is, women are not 
tragically over-represented in informal sector compare to men, thus, the significance of gender inequity 
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could still be minimised (see table 6). However, one must be wary that, other things equal, women have 
more significant needs of healthcare, particularly maternal health, therefore, gender inequity may instead 
increase the vulnerability of women in healthcare services. 
Compared to formal sector, whereby the employers are responsible for paying large proportion of 
contribution (4% by employers and 0.5% by employees), fixed contribution by informal workers may 
instead reinforce health inequity between formal and informal workers, especially those with low-income. 
According to various surveys, BPJS Health premiums are actually higher than the amount that informal 
workers are willing to contribute. Handayani, Gondodiputro and Saefullah (2013) study in district of Hulu 
Sungai Selatan, Borneo found that majority of informal workers (mostly farmers) are only willing to pay 
IDR5,000 per month, which is only a quarter of the lowest premium set by BPJS (IDR25,500). ILO (2010) 
study for informal workers on various districts in Indonesia also revealed that 26% of workers cannot 
afford to pay the premium, whereby 40% of the sample are only willing to pay less than IDR10,000. 
Furthermore, only 11% of informal workers are willing to pay above IDR20,000 who are mostly at the 
highest income quintile of informal workers. Joedadibrata (2002 as cited in Sibarani 2014) also affirms 
that rural informal workers had difficulty in paying the monthly premium of IDR25,000. 
In terms of collecting the premium, one concern for this scheme is due to the nature of employment of 
informal workers in Indonesia. Table 4 had revealed that informal workers are over-represented in 
agricultural sectors, mostly in rural area. Monthly premium makes it difficult for these workers to 
contribute, as farmers only harvest every 3 months which sometimes are affected with droughts or bad 
harvests (Suprobo, Weiss and Tarigan 2007), consequently raising a concern on the continuity of premium 
collection. Apart from rural informal workers, there might be difficulty of premium collection from urban 
informal workers, who are normally street traders. For instance, urban street vendors possessed 
significant vulnerability in terms of irregular income stream, mainly due to, ironically, violence conducted 
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by local government to remove them from public space (Forum Keprihatinan Akademisi 2003, UPLINK-
Indonesia 2008 as cited in Gunadi 2009). 
Referring back to Orem and Zikusooka (2010) which promotes health equity based on people’s ability to 
pay (i.e. rich pay more than the poor), it is clear that current Indonesian scheme does not conform to this 
ideal. While it may be argued that this limitation occurs because of irregular income stream in informal 
economy, a success lesson from South Korea NHI is worth considering. When extending health insurance 
to informal workers, South Korea set the premium according to ‘supposed’ income of the workers, rather 
than fixed contribution.  To illustrate, supposed income is estimated by allocating point scores for age and 
sex of the head of the household, property lease value as well as car tax payment (Jeong 2010). Thus, 
Indonesia could learn from this technique in order to set fair amount of contribution for informal workers. 
3.5.2. Access to information and healthcare services 
In terms of access to information and services, the government has implemented a significant step toward 
socialising the BPJS Health programme and easing the registration for the citizens, for instance, through 
building an interactive website which enables online registration and increase transparency by providing 
much information to the general public. The government also continuously socialise the programme 
through mass media, which comes with a fruitful outcome of high enrolment rates of the scheme just 
within one year i.e. achieving its target enrolment rates for 2014 by 102% (BPJS 2014). Nonetheless, high 
enrolment rates do not necessarily mean that there is improvement of health equity among the citizens. 
Lagomarsino, et al. (2012) debated that when the benefits of insurance scheme are not well understood 
or services are inaccessible, financial coverage is useless. 
One major barrier for informal workers to access the information is low education level. For example, the 
highest education level of majority of informal workers in Surabaya city is primary education thus this may 
affect their understanding of the scheme (Triyono and Soewartoyo 2013). Their understanding is crucial 
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because without adequate information, informal workers may experience social exclusion in medical 
treatments. The problem of social exclusion in Indonesia seems to mirror Criel, et al. (2014) study on 
discriminatory practices by medical practitioners against poor in the case of Ghana NHI. In Indonesia, 
Putranto (2015) reported that poor people often received discriminatory practices, such as removal of 
patients, by medical professional although they are registered under BPJS Health. 
Ruqoyah and Darmawan (2015) reported a case of one casual worker in Jakarta, was being overcharged 
by public hospital amounted to IDR150million for a medical treatment of his newly-born baby. The worker 
admitted that he even had followed all procedural requirements of BPJS Health to pay for first-class 
treatment of his baby; nonetheless the hospital denied his BPJS Health card. He could not do anything 
because the hospital insisted that he did not follow the procedure correctly. This clearly illustrated an 
extreme case of discriminatory and exploitative practices. 
Healthcare services for informal workers under BPJS Health are currently tiered according to the payment 
of premium. This clearly contrasts the principle of health equity, so it rather reinforces health inequity 
between formal and informal sector, as well as among the rich and the poor. Besides, the recipient of PBI 
scheme often experienced stigma in self-identifying as poor, thus creating barrier in accessing health 
services (Rokx, Scheiber, et al. 2009 as cited in Simmonds and Hort 2013). 
Paradoxically, BPJS health has also created ‘insurance effect’, particularly for informal workers, whereby 
healthy workers were rushing to come into health centres and hospitals to get the treatments because 
they ‘have paid’ the contribution premium (BPJS Kesehatan 2015b). Hence, this might be problematic for 
long run sustainability of the system, whereby the pooled funds would be insufficient to cover these 
unnecessary medical expenditures. 
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3.5.3. Health politics: Neoliberal healthcare? 
This section highlights how politics plays an important role in influencing national health system, BPJS 
scheme and finally, workers in informal economy. Evaluating social protection through political lens 
requires wider understanding of the penetrating logic. Social risk management theory has been argued 
for reinforcing neoliberal agenda in healthcare realm, in which the government facilitated market 
operation in healthcare services. In the case of Indonesia, the paper argued, neoliberalism has indeed 
penetrated the construction and the implementation of BPJS Health insurance. 
The current statistics has highlighted that national healthcare has been seriously underfunded compared 
to other government expenditures. At narrowest sense, increasing health expenditure as a percentage of 
government expenditure either through supply-side subsidies and/or demand-side subsidies would solve 
the problem. But instead, the government proposed BPJS Health which requires significant premium 
contributions by the citizens; with the massive new injection will come from informal workers since 
majority of them were previously not covered under old system. McGregor (2001 as cited in Ridha 2014) 
contends that the neoliberal agenda of healthcare reform consist of “cost-cutting for efficiency, 
decentralising to the local or regional level (removing responsibility from the national level) and setting 
up healthcare as a private good for sale rather than a public good paid for with taxpayer money”. 
Indonesian BPJS Health undeniably fits into all these criteria; accordingly it indeed reinforces neoliberal 
ideal in the realm of healthcare rather than leaning toward the original constitution 1945 (i.e. health as 
rights of the citizens). BPJS health also relies on the principle of ‘individualism’ which is at the core of 
neoliberal ideology i.e. citizens have to pay premium in order to gain the membership (Ridha 2014). This 
henceforth would affect health equity in particular for informal economy workers. 
To understand how political force underpins the establishment of BPJS Health, there is a need to look 
closely on how SJSN law 2004 on social security came into the picture. While it is believed that the law 
 Page 33 of 49  
came as a result of crisis of social protection and pushes from international actors e.g. ILO and WHO 
(Thabrany 2008), it is also partly due to electoral reason. The law was designed in 2002, at the time when 
Megawati sat as the president of Indonesia. She specifically took interest on national social security due 
to her populist background, stemming from nationalism creed established by her father, Soekarno 
(Indonesian first president), as well as her PDI-P political party mission on social welfare (Aspinall 2014). 
The presidential election at that time was due in 2004, thus it would really have made sense when she 
proposed the formulation of the law to run for the second term. Unfortunately, she lost to Yudhoyono, 
whom immediately assumed the position in 2004. Nonetheless, Megawati signed for SJSN Act in 2004 
during her last stay in presidential palace by saying “I produce this Act as a gift for you (Indonesians)” 
(Thabrany 2008). Yudhoyono, coming from Democrat party, had little interest in developing the Act, thus 
social security reform stalled for few years. Only in 2011 finally the law on establishment of social security 
agency, BPJS, was passed by the parliament which partly due to push by members of Megawati’s populist 
party (Aspinall 2014). 
At regional level, the story is no less different. The power of regional leaders due to decentralisation 
reform has also been widely misused by the incumbents to promote populist policies in the realm of 
healthcare to increase their reputation. Aspinall (2014) noted that 2012 Jakarta gubernatorial election 
created a heavily politicised healthcare when two of the contenders, Joko Widodo and Alex Noerdin, had 
already run successful health schemes in their places of origins, assured to introduce the schemes to 
Jakarta whereas the incumbent, Fauzi Bowo, had actually implemented his own health programme. 
Politicisation of healthcare is certainly not a new story; however, the extent in which it may adversely 
affect the citizens is a big concern for the sustainability of the system. In the case of Indonesia, healthcare 
system has been inefficient and full of rent-seeking activities by the government officials, hospitals and 
pharmaceutical agencies (Aspinall 2014). In addition, heavily politicised policy would fail to alter the 
 Page 34 of 49  
power structure that governs the society. BPJS Health, this paper argued, might only reinforce the existing 
power structure while at the same time, fail to address the vulnerability of informal workers. 
The major concern of social protection in Indonesia is to extend the protection to informal sector, either 
through extending the existing schemes or designing targeted scheme specifically for informal workers. 
However, targeted scheme is not really attractive for populist purposes as it only creates narrow-based 
support from specific target population. Broad-based coalition is thus possible through the universal social 
policy, which in this case is national health insurance in the form of BPJS Health. However, it has been 
argued earlier that due to diverse nature of informal economy, there would be different priorities for 
informal workers across jobs and sectors.  In Indonesia, ILO (2010) surveyed that on average, informal 
workers in various sectors and regions put highest priority for accidents at work (36%) while workers’ 
health only comes at second place (29%). It also found gender disparity in terms of priority; female 
informal workers put much more priority for health insurance for themselves and family members (i.e. 
about 50% of workers put health as their first priority) compared to those of men (approximately 30% put 
health as their first priority). In terms of priority diseases, as mentioned previously, there has been a 
serious prevalence of tobacco smoking among Indonesians which might lead to specific health diseases, 
i.e. lung or mouth cancers. 
BPJS Health irrefutably ignored this reality. Yet, it even extends the universality nature into recipients’ 
health treatments by covering almost all treatments from primary to tertiary healthcare. There is no harm 
of proposing universal policy, however, in the case of fiscal crisis, it would be problematic and not address 
the real problem. In many countries, universalism has been blamed of “not being redistributive and of 
wasting scarce resources on the middle and upper income classes and the undeserving poor” 
(Mkandawire 2015). To demonstrate this fiscal crisis, in just over a year, BPJS Health has run into negative 
account balance of IDR1.9trillion (Praditya 2015). It is argued by some that the loss occurred because 
contributory premiums were set too low thus not enough to cover all benefits received (Praditya 2015; 
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Solidaritas.net 2015). Hence, the government has planned to increase the premiums by IDR10,000 for 
each class of treatment (Solidaritas.net 2015). However, informal workers have no strong channel to 
oppose such increase because the union that most often protests is the formal workers’ union 
(Solidaritas.net 2013). Hence, BPJS Health fails to change the existing power structure thus only adversely 
incorporates informal workers into the system. 
BPJS Health also fails to address the vulnerability of informal workers because it does not address the 
problem of underinvestment by the government in health sector (Ridha 2014). Because of its neoliberal 
creed, it instead leads to more underinvestment by the government at the same time, increasing the 
burden of the payers. Under BPJS Health, the government only subsidises the payment for the poor (PBI) 
and the civil servants while neglecting the fact that significant portion of paying informal workers are not 
able to pay for the premium. Worse still, the government operates cross-sanctioned policy for the late 
and nonpayers of BPJS Health (for informal workers and other fixed-premium payers) by excluding them 
from accessing other public services (BPJS Kesehatan 2015a). This sanction, hence, only reinforces the 
existing power structure and worsens health inequity particularly for informal workers.  
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4. Conclusions 
The study has argued that there has been convergence on viewing social protection, health protection in 
particular, as both rights of individuals as well as the means in achieving other developmental goals. 
However, the absence of health protection in informal economy has been attributed for reinforcing health 
inequity between formal and informal workers. Substantial informality in most developing countries has 
pushed the government to find an effective way to extend health protection in informal sector. This study 
presents that while national health insurance is an option for promoting health equity between formal 
and informal workers, several problems which might reinforce health inequity have been highlighted; 
contributory premium issues, access to information and health services and different priorities of informal 
workers. 
In Indonesia, fragmented social protection system had failed to incorporate large proportion of informal 
workers. Health protection is undeniably needed for these workers, as this paper argued, due to their high 
vulnerability in the case of large medical costs. The launching of BPJS Health, a government-run health 
insurance as pathway to achieve universal health coverage is hoped to protect informal workers from this 
problem. Nonetheless, like other developing countries, this scheme has a potential to adversely 
incorporate these workers, which ultimately, reinforce health inequity between formal and informal 
workers.  
The finding suggests that fixed contributory premium set by the government is much higher than what 
informal workers are willing to pay. Where informal workers are mainly over-represented in agriculture, 
monthly payment method also makes it difficult for these workers to contribute due to seasonal harvest 
problem. Lack of clear definition of informal workers under social security law may also reinforce gender 
inequity as it opens the space for the male employers to evade from paying contributions of their female 
informal workers. In terms of access to healthcare services, on the one hand, it is also found that poorly 
informed informal workers often experienced social exclusion in the form of discriminatory practices by 
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the health practitioners. On the other hand, the scheme created moral hazard problem whereby many 
informal workers use health facilities more frequently when they enrol into the scheme. At broader level, 
the paper also adds to discussion on politicisation of healthcare, where neoliberalism indeed underpins 
the formulation and implementation of BPJS Health. The scheme merely strengthens power imbalance 
between the politicians and vulnerable informal workers i.e. repudiating these workers from other public 
services in the case of late or non-payments. Thus, it is concluded that, based on these parameters, the 
scheme only adversely incorporates informal workers into the system. 
This paper, nevertheless, is far from suggesting the government to scrap BPJS Health scheme. It instead 
proposes that the government should address these issues in order to make the scheme be more 
favourable toward informal workers. Some suggestions are as follows; reconciling the term informal 
economy between BPS statistical body and SJSN law on social security for ensuring fairer contribution, 
followed by revising payment method for informal workers, for instance, following South Korea’s method 
in setting contributory premium; improving quality controls of health facilities to avoid discriminatory 
treatments; and finally increasing government investment for healthcare infrastructure while at the same 
time, providing proper channel for informal workers to voice out their views on government policies to 
counterbalance unequal power structure in the society. The government also needs to address other 
health issues apart from its financing part, i.e. prevalence of tobacco smoking that might lead to 
substantial health costs. These recommendations therefore call for further in-depth and technical 
researches in these specific issues on national health insurance. 
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5. Appendices 
Table 1. Indonesia: Health Insurance Coverage by Scheme, 2013 
 
Table 2. Determining Informal Worker Group Based on Job Status and Type of Main Jobs in Indonesia 
 
  
Millions of 
people
% of total 
population
Jamkesmas Poor and near-poor (bottom 40%) 76.4 32
Askes Civil servants (nonmilitary) 14 6
Jamsostek
Formal private sector workers + informal (to 
some extent) 4.8 3
Jamkesda Subnational schemes (estimated) 36 15
Private Voluntary insurance — household individual 6.6 3
Military Military service employees 2 1
TOTAL 139.8 58
Source: Mukti (2013 as cited in Bitran 2014)
MembershipScheme
Coverage
Professio
nal
Manageri
al
Clerical 
worker
Sales 
worker
Service 
provider
Agricultu
re 
worker
Producti
on 
worker
Operator Labourer Other
1. Own account worker F F F INF INF INF INF INF INF INF
2. Employer assisted by 
temporary worker/unpaid 
worker
F F F F F INF F F F INF
3. Employer assisted by 
permanent worker/paid 
worker
F F F F F F F F F F
4. Regular employee F F F F F F F F F F
5. Casual employee in 
agriculture
F F F INF INF INF INF INF INF INF
6. Casual employee not in 
agriculture
F F F INF INF INF INF INF INF INF
7. Family worker/unpaid 
worker
INF INF INF INF INF INF INF INF INF INF
Note: F -Formal INF-Informal
Source: BPS (2006 as cited in Suprobo, Tarigan and Weiss 2007)
Main Occupation
Employment Status
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Table 3. Informal sector in Indonesia (millions of workers), 2001-2009 
 
Table 4.  The tendency of informality based on types of main jobs in Indonesia 
 
  
2001 2003 2006 2009
Informal - Urban 13.93 14.83 15.85 17.97
Informal - Rural 41.88 43.61 44.92 46.87
Informal -Men 33.07 37.05 38.48 38.56
Informal - Women 22.74 21.40 22.29 26.28
Total Informal 55.81 58.45 60.77 64.84
Total Employment 90.81 90.78 95.18 104.49
Informal employment as % of 
total employment -New 
definition
61.5 64.4 63.4 62.1
Informal employment as % of 
total employment -Old 
definition
67.7 70.8 69.8 69.5
Source: ILO (2010)
2006 2009
Professional 0.5 0.3
Managerial and Administrative 0.0 0.0
Clerical 0.7 0.9
Sales 59.1 58.1
Services 29.2 32.5
Agriculture, farming, forestry, 
fisheries and hunting 93.1 93.2
Production, operator, labourer 45.1 46.8
Source: BPS (2009 as cited in ILO 2010)
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Table 5. Monthly wage, working hours and wage per hour in Indonesian informal economy, 2006-2008 
 
Table 6. Indonesian informal economy by gender, 2009 
 
  
2006 2007 2008
Average monthly wage (IDR)
Men 827,101 958,971 1,031,348
Women 612,131 715,414 773,979
Working hours
Men 44 45 44
Women 41 42 41
Wage per hour (IDR per hour)
Men 18,798 21,310 23,440
Women 14,930 17,034 18,878
Source: BPS (2009 as cited in ILO 2010)
Sex
Thousands
% of non-
agricultural 
employment
Thousands
% of non-
agricultural 
employment
Thousands
% of non-
agricultural 
employment
Women 1,180 72.9 1,034 63.9 227 14
Men 1,977 72.3 1,788 65.4 305 11.1
Source: ILO (2013)
Informal employment 
outside informal sector
Employment in the 
informal sector
Informal employment
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Figure 1A. The structure of Informal Economy 
 
Source: WIEGO (n.d.) 
Poverty Risks Average Earnings Segmentation by Sex
Low High
Predominantly Men
Men and Women
Predominantly Women
High Low
Employers
Informal Wage 
Workers: 
Regular
Own Account 
Operators
Informal Wage Workers: 
Casual
Industrial Outworkers/ Homeworkers
Unpaid Family Workers
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Figure 2A. Health Financing System Profile: Indonesia, 2013 
 
Source: WHO (2015) 
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